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SHEDDING TIERS: 
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR EQUAL 
PROTECTION JURISPRUDENCE 
DANIELLE STEFANUCCI† 
INTRODUCTION 
This Note argues that the Supreme Court of the United States 
should reconsider the tiers of scrutiny framework that courts use 
to evaluate equal protection claims.  The Supreme Court has 
recognized government classifications on the bases of race and 
gender to be suspect and to merit heightened judicial scrutiny.1  
However, any governmental classification among people is subject 
to review under the Equal Protection Clause.2  The class itself is 
not suspect; the basis for the classification, like race or gender, is 
treated by courts as more or less suspect. 
 
† Senior Articles Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2020, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.A., 2017, Boston College. Thank you to Professor John Q. 
Barrett for his invaluable advice and assistance on this Note (and throughout my time 
in law school) and to my friends and family for their constant, unconditional support. 
1 Current equal protection jurisprudence functions as a three-tiered framework: 
strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review. Clark v. Jeter, 486 
U.S. 456, 461 (1988). Strict scrutiny requires that the government have a compelling 
interest achieved using the least restrictive means; it is applied to classifications on 
the basis of race, national origin, and alienage—or when a fundamental interest is 
implicated—and the burden of proof is on the government to prove the classification 
is proper. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016); Crawford v. 
Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 
(1967). Intermediate scrutiny requires the law substantially further an important 
governmental objective; it is applied to classifications on the basis of sex—where the 
government must have an “exceedingly persuasive justification”—and nonmarital 
child status, and the burden of proof is on the government to prove the classification 
is proper. See, e.g., Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689–90 (2017); 
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976). Finally, rational basis review requires 
that the law is rationally related to a cognizable legislative objective; it is applied to 
classifications on any basis not found to merit heightened scrutiny, and the burden of 
proof is on the challenger to prove the classification is invalid. See, e.g., Armour v. City 
of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 676 (2012); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., 348 U.S. 
483, 489 (1955). 
2 The equal protection guarantee also applies to the federal government through 
the liberty guarantee of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. See United States 
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769–70 (2013) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,  
499 (1954)). 
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However, employing the tiers of scrutiny no longer makes 
sense in an era when traditional understandings of race and 
gender continue to break down.  Relatedly, it is time to reassess 
the current jurisprudential approach because the Supreme Court 
has frequently failed to adhere to the tiers of scrutiny framework 
it has articulated.3  Part I of this Note discusses the breakdown of 
race and gender as definable and cognizable classes, relying  
on social science evidence-based understandings of these 
classifications.  Section I.A focuses on the current understanding 
of gender and contemplates the ramifications of this change on 
equal protection jurisprudence.  Section I.B undertakes the same 
analysis for race.  
Part II suggests a new framework for how equal protection 
jurisprudence should function in light of these scientific and 
epistemological changes.  In employing this framework, a court 
considering an equal protection claim would balance the 
government interest against the individual interest on a 
case-by-case basis.  This approach would change equal protection 
analysis at all levels of the judiciary: in state courts, federal 
district courts, circuit courts, and at the Supreme Court.  
Part III justifies this new framework as a more egalitarian 
way to undertake equal protection analysis because it allows a 
court to consider each case’s unique factual circumstances, while 
still operating within the bounds of established constitutional 
principles.  Part IV applies the suggested framework to two 
cases—one retrospective and one prospective.  The retrospective 
case focuses on a classification on the basis of age and mirrors the  
 
 
 
 
 
3 For cases where laws were struck down under rational basis review, see, for 
example, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982); U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973). For arguments that 
contemporary sex discrimination jurisprudence resembles strict scrutiny, see United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 579 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This 
unacknowledged adoption of what amounts to (at least) strict scrutiny is without 
antecedent in our sex-discrimination cases and by itself discredits the Court’s 
decision.”). For cases where laws were upheld under a strict scrutiny framework, see 
Fisher, 136 S. Ct. 2208; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003); Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). While this failure to comply with existing 
jurisprudence also underscores the need for a new framework, it is not the focus of 
this Note. 
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facts of Massachusetts v. Murgia.4  The prospective case focuses on 
the United States’s military ban on transgender individuals and 
mirrors the facts of Karnoski v. Trump.5  
I. THE BREAKDOWN OF CLASSIFICATIONS 
A. Gender 
In a series of cases litigated in the 1970s, the Supreme Court 
recognized government classifications on the basis of sex as 
suspect and meriting increased judicial scrutiny.6  In establishing 
intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of scrutiny, the 
Court employed the terms sex and gender interchangeably.7  At 
that time, the conception of sex—both in society and among the 
Supreme Court justices—was binary: male and female.8  
Additionally, the language of the opinions acknowledged the 
existence of biological differences between men and women.9  
Based on these innate disparities, the justices concluded that 
sex-based classifications are not always arbitrary, which formed 
the central argument for why sex-based classifications only merit 
 
4 427 U.S. 307, 308 (1976). 
5 No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018). 
Plaintiffs alleged that President Donald Trump’s ban on transgender individuals 
serving in the military violates the Equal Protection Clause, substantive due  
process notions, and the First Amendment. Id. at *4. This Note focuses on the equal 
protection claim. 
6 In Reed v. Reed, decided in 1971, the Court struck down a law classifying on the 
basis of sex for the first time, albeit under rational basis review. 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 
(1971). In Frontiero v. Richardson, decided in 1973, sex-based classifications failed to 
receive five votes to warrant strict scrutiny. 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973). The Court 
decided on intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of scrutiny in Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976). 
7 Craig, 429 U.S. at 204 (“Suffice to say that the showing offered by the appellees 
does not satisfy us that sex represents a legitimate, accurate proxy for the regulation 
of drinking and driving. In fact . . . the relationship between gender and traffic safety 
becomes far too tenuous to satisfy Reed’s requirement that the gender-based difference 
be substantially related to achievement of the statutory objective.”) (emphasis added). 
8 GEORGE DVORSKY & JAMES HUGHES, INST. FOR ETHICS AND EMERGING 
TECHNOLOGIES, POSTGENDERISM: BEYOND THE GENDER BINARY 2 (2008). The 
language of the Court’s opinions also reinforces this conception. See Craig, 429 U.S. 
at 197 (“[S]tatutory classifications that distinguish between males and females are 
‘subject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.’ To withstand constitutional 
challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must  
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.” (quoting Reed, 404 U.S. at 75) (citation omitted) 
(emphasis added)). 
9 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“Physical 
differences between men and women, however, are enduring . . . .”). 
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intermediate scrutiny.10  While some feminist and progressive 
scholars distinguished gender from sex and saw gender as a social 
construct, this was not the mainstream view at that time.11  
Today, scientific scholarship distinguishes between sex and 
gender.12  Sex refers to a biological classification, whereas gender 
refers to an individual’s self-identity and the social representation 
of that identity.13  “One is not born, but rather becomes, a  
woman,” such that an individual is born with a biological sex but 
must learn feminine or masculine behaviors to accord with  
societal expectations.14  
Sex, while less complicated than gender, has its own 
complexities: male and female are the two principal biological 
sexes, but other identities exist as well.15  In terms of chromosomal 
makeup, most humans are born with forty-six chromosomes in 
twenty-three pairs, and the X and Y chromosomes determine a 
person’s sex.16  Therefore, most women manifest as 46XX and  
most men as 46XY.17  However, according to the World Health 
Organization, some individuals are born with a single sex 
chromosome, such as those with Turner syndrome, and others 
with three or more sex chromosomes, such as those with 
Klinefelter syndrome, among other variations.18  Intersexuality 
 
10 See, e.g., id. (“‘Inherent differences’ between men and women, we have come to 
appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for denigration of the members of 
either sex or for artificial constraints on an individual’s opportunity.”) 
11 See DVORSKY & HUGHES, supra note 8, at 5; see generally ANN OAKLEY, SEX, 
GENDER, AND SOCIETY 3 (1972). 
12 See, e.g., Joy L. Johnson & Robin Repta, Sex and Gender: Beyond the Binaries, 
in DESIGNING AND CONDUCTING GENDER, SEX, AND HEALTH RESEARCH 17, 17 (John 
Oliffe & Lorraine Greaves, eds., 2011); Albertine J. Odlehinkel, Editorial: Let’s Talk 
About Sex–The Gender Binary Revisited, J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 863, 863 
(2017); Britta N. Torgrimson & Christopher T. Minson, Sex and Gender: What is the 
Difference?, J. APPLIED PHYSIOLOGY 785, 785–86 (2005), https://www.physiology.org/ 
doi/full/10.1152/japplphysiol.00376.2005. 
13 See, e.g., Johnson & Repta, supra note 12, at 17; Odlehinkel, supra note 12, at 
863; Torgrimson & Minson, supra note 12, at 785–86. 
14 JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER 22 (1994) (quoting SIMONE DE 
BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX 267 (H.M. Parshley trans., 1953)). 
15 Gender and Genetics, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/genomics/ 
gender/en/index1.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).  
16 Id. 
17 Id. Some females are born 46XY due to mutations in the Y chromosome, and 
some males are born 46XX due to a translocation of a section of the Y chromosome. Id. 
18 Id. Turner syndrome, which only affects women, occurs when one of the X 
chromosomes is missing or partially missing and can lead to a variety of 
developmental and medical problems, including short stature and heart defects. 
Turner Syndrome, MAYO CLINIC, https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/ 
turner-syndrome/symptoms-causes/syc-20360782 (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
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introduces another complication in differentiating among sexes; 
the World Health Organization broadly defines intersexuality as 
a “congenital anomaly of the reproductive and sexual system.”19  
The incidence of intersexuality—while difficult to reliably 
approximate—is estimated at between one and two percent of the 
global population, but it may be as high as four percent.20  
Additionally, scientific scholars no longer consider gender  
to be binary, a change which has been reflected in the gender 
identity lexicon.21  At its core, gender identity is internal and 
self-identified.22  According to the American Psychological 
Association, gender identity refers to a “person’s deeply felt, 
inherent sense of being a boy, a man, or male; a girl, woman, or 
female; or an alternative gender . . . that may or may not 
correspond to a person’s sex assigned at birth or to a person’s 
primary or secondary sex characteristics.”23  Self-identification 
permits a multiplicity of gender identities, including transgender, 
gender-fluid,24 agender,25 genderqueer,26 and the umbrella term  
 
Klinefelter syndrome, which only affects men, occurs when there is an extra X 
chromosome and can affect puberty and fertility. Klinefelter Syndrome, MAYO CLINIC, 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/klinefelter-syndrome/symptoms-
causes/syc-20353949 (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).  
19 Gender and Genetics, supra note 15. 
20 See DVORSKY & HUGHES, supra note 8, at 3. This higher figure for the incidence 
of intersexuality reflects a definition including “all genital abnormalities.” Id.; see also 
Anne Fausto-Sterling, How Many Sexes Are There, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at A29 
(claiming John Money, a specialist in congenital sex-organ defects at Johns Hopkins 
University, estimates the incidence of intersexual individuals at four percent). 
21 See, e.g., Cyndney Adams, The Gender Identity Terms You Need to Know, CBS 
NEWS (March 24, 2017, 10:22 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transgender-
gender-identity-terms-glossary/. 
22 American Psychological Ass’n, Guidelines for Psychological Practice with 
Transgender and Gender Nonconforming People, 70 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, 832, 
862 (2015), https://www.apa.org/practice/guidelines/transgender.pdf. 
23 Id. 
24 The term “gender-fluid,” not added to the Oxford English Dictionary until  
2016, is defined as “a person who does not identify with a single fixed gender; of or  
relating to a person having or expressing a fluid or unfixed gender identity.”  
Noel Gutierrez-Morfin, ‘Gender-Fluid’ Among Recent Additions to Oxford English 
Dictionary, NBC NEWS (Sept. 16, 2016, 4:46 P.M.), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/ 
nbc-out/gender-fluid-among-recent-additions-oxford-english-dictionary-n649571. 
25 “Agender” is defined as “[d]esignating a person who does not identify as 
belonging to a particular gender; of or relating to such people.” Agender, OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/47450702?redirectedFrom= 
agender (last visited Oct. 20, 2019).  
26 “Genderqueer” is defined as “designating a person who does not subscribe to 
conventional gender distinctions, but identifies with neither, both, or a combination 
of male and female genders”; according to the OED, “Genderqueer is used as neutral 
or positive term of self-reference, without regard to, or in implicit denial of, the 
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of gender non-binary.27  Transgender identity encompasses 
individuals “whose sense of personal identity and gender does not 
correspond to that person’s sex at birth,” and includes, but is not 
limited to, those who have undergone gender reassignment 
surgery.28  Further, transgender has superseded “transsexual” and 
“transvestite” as the socially acceptable term.29  
Perhaps driven by sociological and scientific experts, 
laypeople have also relaxed their strict conception of gender roles.  
In the 1970s, the popular stereotype was that women ought to be 
wives and mothers.30  This was reflected in the female labor force 
participation rate, which was between forty-two and fifty percent, 
compared to around fifty-six percent today.31  In the early 1970s, 
only fifteen to twenty members of the House of Representatives 
and one or two Senators were women; consequently, women were 
unable to remedy discrimination against them from inside the 
political process.32  The 116th Congress, elected in the 2018 
midterm elections, has 126 female representatives out of a total of 
535 representatives.33  The House of Representatives also boasts a 
record number of women, with 100 female representatives—
thirty-five newly elected, sixty-five incumbent—compared to a 
previous high of eighty-five.34 
 
 
 
 
original negative connotations of QUEER.” Gender, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/77468?redirectedFrom=genderqueer#eid237081402 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019).  
27 Adams, supra note 21 (“Non-binary: Any gender that falls outside of the binary 
system of male/female or man/woman.”).  
28 Transgender, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view 
dictionaryentry/Entry/247649 (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
29 A Guide to Transgender Terms, BBC MAGAZINE (June 3, 2015), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32979297.  
30 See, e.g., Kristin Donnelly, et al., Attitudes Towards Women’s Work and Family 
Roles in the United States, 1976-2013, PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 41, 41 (2016). 
31 International Labor Organization, Labor Force Participation Rate, Female, 
WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations= 
US (last visited Oct. 20, 2019); Bureau of Labor Statistics, Women at Work: A Visual 
Essay, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Oct. 2003, at 46, https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2003/ 
10/ressum3.pdf. 
32 MILDRED AMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 
CONGRESS: 1917-2008 96–97 (2008). 
33 Eli Watkins, Record Number of Women Elected to the House, CNN (Nov. 9, 
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/07/politics/women-house-senate/index.html. 
34 Id. 
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The development of scientific and lay perceptions reveals  
that sex-based classifications frequently rely on antiquated 
stereotypes.35  It is reductive to assume that an entire sex has the 
same abilities, or inabilities, in any particular area:  for example, 
a particular woman may be less equipped to be an estate 
administrator than a particular man, but the assumption cannot 
be made that all men are more equipped than all women for such 
a role without individualized determinations.36  In light of 
scientific evidence that gender is socialized and has no biological 
basis, gender may in fact always be an invalid basis for 
classification; by that logic, such a classification would be 
precluded even when the distinction relates to biological 
differences. 
It is more complicated to employ the characteristics that led 
to sex-based classifications being deemed suspect in this context of 
new gender identity descriptors.37  First, since gender identity is 
self-identified rather than based on objective biological criteria, 
there are an ostensibly unlimited number of identities.38  
Consequently, a legislature, or any other government actor, 
cannot reliably define a class with demarcated boundaries, 
particularly given that the characteristic may not be visible 
because it is the product of an individual’s wholly valid, but 
subjective, mental state.39  For example, the transgender military 
ban implementation plan excludes from military service both 
those “with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria” and those 
 
35 Brief for Appellant at 17, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4) (“Whatever 
differences may exist between the sexes, legislative judgments have frequently been 
based on inaccurate stereotypes of the capacities and sensibilities of women.”). This 
brief was drafted by Ruth Bader Ginsburg while she was a law professor at Rutgers 
Law School, along with Melvin Wulf for the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”). 
Ginsburg was the co-founder of the Women’s Rights Project at the ACLU in 1972 and 
argued six gender discrimination cases before the Supreme Court between 1973 and 
1978. Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES 
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/other/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-wrp-staff 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/ 
justices/ruth_bader_ginsburg (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
36 Brief for Appellant, supra note 35, at 20 (“The result is that the whole class  
is relegated to an inferior legal status without regard to the capabilities or 
characteristics of its individual members.”). 
37 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686–89 (1973). 
38 See American Psychological Ass’n, supra note 22. 
39 Cf., Brief for Appellant, supra note 35, at 15 (“Both classifications [of race and 
gender] create large, natural classes.”); see also American Psychological Ass’n, supra 
note 22. 
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who “require or have undergone gender transition.”40  This 
definition of transgender does not include all those who may 
identify as transgender; it attempts to impose a biological  
criterion on a self-defined characteristic.  Transgender identity, as 
understood by the scientific community, requires only gender 
identification different from birth sex; consequently, it also 
includes individuals who may never have sought treatment for 
gender dysphoria and may never undergo hormone therapy or sex 
reassignment surgery.41  
Second, even if legislatures were able to reliably define classes 
based on these new categories, the classes could be based on 
non-binary identity generally or transgender identity specifically.  
The former defines a class by negative implication: it is not an 
affirmatively defined class, but a catchall “other” of those who do 
not identify as male or female.42  These imprecise classifications 
are at issue in the cases pertaining to transgender servicemembers 
in the military and bathroom usage by transgender students.43  In 
the latter, certain public schools require individuals to use the 
bathroom of the sex to which they were biologically assigned at 
birth or lack a defined policy on the issue.44  The Trump 
administration, through Department of Health and Human 
Services regulations, is also considering amending the legal 
definition of sex under Title IX.45  Under the new regulations, sex 
would be “either male or female, unchangeable, and determined 
by the genitals a person is born with.”46  This classification would 
affect not only transgender people, but anyone who identifies as 
non-binary, a more expansive category.  While Title IX claims are 
statutory rather than constitutional, this proposed change in  
 
40 Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *1 (W.D. Wash. 
Apr. 13, 2018).  
41 S.C. Meier & C.M. Labuski, The Demographics of the Transgender Population, 
in INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF THE DEMOGRAPHY OF SEXUALITY 289, 291 (A.K. 
Baumle ed. 2013). 
42 Non-binary, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/ 
definition/non-binary (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (“Denoting or relating to a gender or 
sexual identity that is not defined in terms of traditional binary oppositions such as 
male and female or homosexual and heterosexual.”). 
43 See, e.g., Karnoski, 2018 WL 1784464, at *1; Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 
302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 736–37 (E.D. Va. 2018). 
44 See, e.g., Grimm, 302 F.Supp. 3d at 737–38. 
45 Erica L. Green, Katie Benner & Robert Pear, ‘Transgender’ Could Be Defined 
Out of Existence Under Trump Administration, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/21/us/politics/transgender-trump-administration-
sex-definition.html. 
46 Id. 
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the legal definition of sex could be translated to the  
equal protection context and would implicate questions of the 
appropriate reference classes. 
Were the courts to move forward with these new proposed 
bases for classification—like non-binary status or transgender 
status—courts would have to consider whether to delineate them 
separately or to include them in the already established areas of 
sex or sexual orientation.  If defined separately, governmental 
classifications on these bases would likely only be analyzed under 
rational basis review because the Court infrequently recognizes 
new suspect classifications.47  Rational basis review provides very 
little protection to the challenger and requires a finding of 
animus—no rational legislative purpose—to be struck down.48 
If these classifications were included in current gender 
jurisprudence, the legal inequalities of those groups would be 
subsumed into those of women; while there are still inequalities 
between men and women, the issues, both legal and cultural, faced 
by gender non-binary individuals are distinct from those faced by 
women.49  Additionally, a transgender woman may identify as a 
woman and not necessarily as transgender; would this exclude her 
from a so-called “transgender” class?  Nor do transgender 
individuals, while included in the LGBT acronym, necessarily 
have the same concerns as those who identify as lesbian, gay,  
or bisexual.50  Recent litigation pertaining to LGB individuals 
focused on marriage equality, whereas transgender individuals 
face discrimination in the workplace, housing, school, healthcare, 
etc.51  As a result, some transgender activists call for dissociating 
 
47 The last recognition of a suspect classification was nonmarital child status in 
1988. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
48 However, for cases where laws were struck down under rational basis review, 
see supra text accompanying note 3.  
49 See Nikki Graff, Anna Brown & Eileen Patten, The Narrowing, but Persistent, 
Gender Gap in Pay, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 9, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/04/09/gender-pay-gap-facts (recognizing a wage gap of around 18% between 
men and women); see also Stephanie Zacharek, Eliana Dockterman & Haley 
Sweetland Edwards, The Silence Breakers, TIME, http://time.com/time-person-of-the-
year-2017-silence-breakers (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (recognizing the leaders of the 
#MeToo movement as Time people of the year). 
50 See Alexandra Bolles, 5 of the Most Unsettling Realities for America’s Trans 
Community, GLAAD (Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.glaad.org/blog/5-most-unsettling-
realities-americas-trans-community. 
51 Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03, 2608 (2015) 
(recognizing same-sex marriage as a right protected by the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause), with National  
 
1244 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1235 
transgender individuals from the LGBT acronym, and the ACLU 
has a separate category for transgender issues within LGBT rights 
on its website.52 
Gender identity is also distinct from sexual orientation: if a 
transgender woman also identifies as a lesbian, into which “class” 
would she be properly categorized?53  These complicated 
intersections highlight the conflict between individual identity 
and governmental classifications.  Intersectionality, introduced by 
Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989 to describe the unique disadvantages 
of black women, refers to the “overlapping and interdependent 
systems of discrimination or disadvantage.”54  Legislation seeks to 
work with a set of broad-based facts and, in doing so, may often 
gloss over individual experiences. 
Further, many gender identities are poorly defined or  
have overlapping definitions.55  For example, there may not  
be a meaningful distinction between genderfluidity and 
genderqueerness.56  Even if so, these are arguably not distinctions 
that should be parsed by justices in trying to carve out new 
protected classes.57  The proliferation of gender identities raises 
 
Transgender Discrimination Survey: Full Report, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER 
EQUALITY (Sept. 11, 2012), https://transequality.org/issues/resources/national-trans 
gender-discrimination-survey-full-report.  
52 See Katie Glover, Why It’s Time to Take the T out of LGBT, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 
10, 2015), https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/why-its-time-to-take-the-t-out-of-
lgbt-10493352.html; LGBT Rights, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu.org/ 
issues/lgbt-rights. 
53 Carla Moleiro & Nuna Pinto, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity: Review 
of Concepts, Controversies, and Their Relation to Psychopathology Classification 
Systems, FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. (2015) (asserting that sexual orientation and gender 
identity are distinct).  
54 Intersectionality, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/ 
Entry/429843 (last visited Oct. 20, 2019); see also Merrill Perlman, The Origin of the 
Term ‘Intersectionality’, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.cjr. 
org/language_corner/intersectionality.php.  
55 See supra notes 23–28 for a discussion of definitions of different gender 
identities. 
56 See supra notes 24 and 26, specifically highlighting the ambiguities and overlap 
in these two definitions.  
57 This accords with ideas of judicial restraint. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Roberts 
Emphasizes High Court’s Restraint, Independence, WASHINGTON POST (May 7, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/chief-justice-says-independence 
-and-restraint-should-be-high-courts-guiding-lights/2016/05/07/c42fdf5c-139d-11e6-
8967-7ac733c56f12_story.html?noredirect=on. Additionally, judges may be more 
biased than the general public in cases where traditional gender roles are challenged. 
See Judges as Susceptible to Gender Bias as Laypeople—and Sometimes More So, 
SCIENCE DAILY (Apr. 19, 2018), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/04/ 
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the question of the stopping point: would each individual gender 
identity require its own suspect class recognition?  In sum, it  
is likely improper for a judge to reject an individual’s 
self-identification and impose his own conception of what that 
individual’s gender might be. 
Courts defer to self-identified characteristics in some areas of 
constitutional jurisprudence, including religion.58  In cases 
implicating the Free Exercise Clause, courts do not inquire into 
veracity of beliefs, but, once determining that they are sincerely 
held, deem them valid.59  This underlies the contention that given 
the failure of gender as a binary classification, suspect 
classification analysis—especially given the Court’s reluctance to 
recognize new suspect classes—falls short in considering the new 
issues faced with a multiplicity of gender identities. 
B. Race 
The Supreme Court recognized race and national origin as 
suspect bases for classification in 1944.60  The Equal Protection 
Clause aimed to protect newly-freed African Americans as one of 
the post-Civil War Reconstruction amendments.61  In the first 
definition of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Slaughter-House 
Cases characterized its “pervading purpose” as “the freedom of the 
slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, 
 
180419141541.htm (discussing Andrea L. Miller, Expertise Fails to Attenuate 
Gendered Biases in Judicial Decision-Making, SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY  
SCI. (2018)). 
58 See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184–85 (1965). 
59 Id. (“Local boards and courts in this sense are not free to reject beliefs because 
they consider them ‘incomprehensible.’ Their task is to decide whether the beliefs 
professed by a registrant are sincerely held . . . . This is the threshold question of 
sincerity which must be resolved in every case.”). 
60 Korematsu v. United States stated that while classifications based on race are 
not per se unconstitutional, courts must subject them to “the most rigid scrutiny.” 323 
U.S. 214, 216 (1944); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) 
(“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very 
nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine  
of equality.”). 
61 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872). John Bingham, the 
amendment’s principal drafter, said the following: 
No state ever had the right, under the forms of law or otherwise, to deny to 
any freemen the equal protection of the laws or to abridge the privileges or 
immunities of any citizen of the Republic, although many of them have 
assumed and exercised the power, and that without remedy. 
Lambert Gingras, Congressional Misunderstandings and the Ratifiers’ 
Understanding: The Case of the Fourteenth Amendment, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 41, 45 
(1996) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866)). 
1246 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1235 
and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the 
oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited 
dominion over him.”62  This paternalistic attitude towards people 
of color persisted into the 1950s, when most of the race-based 
classification cases were decided.63  At this time, race was 
frequently understood by the general public to have a biological 
basis, despite contrary statements by the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”).64  
The massive pushback against Brown v. Board of Education and 
the continued existence of anti-miscegenation laws underscored 
the conception that black people were widely considered 
biologically inferior to white people.65  Many, including the trial 
court judge in Loving v. Virginia—the case striking down 
anti-miscegenation statutes as violating the Equal Protection 
Clause—continued to believe the two races should not mix in 
schools or in marriages.66 
While race relations in the United States are still fraught  
with tension, the country’s popular conception of race has  
changed dramatically.67  There is consensus among the biological, 
anthropological, and sociological academic communities that race 
is a social construct with no biological basis.68  Race raises a 
 
62 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 71. 
63 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 
629, 635–36 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637, 
642 (1950). 
64 Robert Wald Sussman, There Is No Such Thing as Race, NEWSWEEK (Nov. 8, 
2014, 3:01 P.M.), https://www.newsweek.com/there-no-such-thing-race-283123.  
65 The governor of Arkansas ordered the Arkansas National Guard to stand 
shoulder to shoulder to prevent admitted black students from entering the newly 
desegregated school. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 11 (1958).  
66 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (“Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, 
malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the 
interference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The 
fact that he separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to  
mix.” (quoting the trial court opinion)). Possible governmental purposes for 
anti-miscegenation statutes were to “ ‘preserve the racial integrity of its citizens’, and 
to prevent ‘the corruption of blood,’ ‘a mongrel breed of citizens,’ and ‘the obliteration 
of racial pride.’ ” Id. at 7.  
67 See, e.g., Andrew Arenge, Stephanie Perry & Dartunorro Clark, Poll: 64 Percent 
of Americans Say Racism Remains a Major Problem, NBC NEWS (May 29, 2018, 4:44 
AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/poll-64-percent-americans-say-
racism-remains-major-problem-n877536; see also German Lopez, There are Huge 
Racial Disparities in How US Police Use Force, VOX (Nov. 14, 2018, 4:12 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/identities/2016/8/13/17938186/police-shootings-killings-racism-
racial-disparities. 
68 See, e.g., Audrey Smedley & Brian D. Smedley, Race as Biology is Fiction, 
Racism as a Social Problem is Real: Anthropological and Historical Perspective on the 
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reference class question similar to gender, namely how to  
define the proper boundaries of a racial group to best facilitate 
courts’ analyses.  This ambiguity extends to dictionary definitions.  
Merriam-Webster defines race as all of the following: “a family, 
tribe, people, or nation belonging to the same stock,” “a class or 
kind of people unified by shared interests, habits, or 
characteristics,” and “an actually or potentially interbreeding 
group within a species.”69 
Given that there are no biological distinctions underlying 
what we understand as racial groups, there is no valid reason for 
classifying individuals on the basis of those groups in the first 
place.  However, despite their biological irrelevance, social 
constructions of racial groups have arguably become endowed with 
independent cultural significance.70  Delineation of racial groups 
allows the dominant group to otherize and to justify subjugation 
towards minority groups.71  The question of majoritarianism 
becomes increasingly complex in light of demographic projections 
that white Americans will constitute less than half the  
population in 2044; a group of diminishing size may feel 
increasingly threatened.72 
However, even among social constructions of racial groups, 
proper boundaries are difficult to ascertain.  For example, the 
number of races in the current American cultural context is 
ambiguous.73  As of the 2017 census, the United States Census 
Bureau demarcated five categories for race: White, Black or 
African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, and 
 
Social Construction of Race, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 16, 16 (2005) (“[R]acial 
distinctions . . . are not genetically discrete, are not reliably measured, and are not 
scientifically meaningful.”). 
69 Race, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/race 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
70 See, e.g., Smedley & Smedley, supra note 68. 
71 See, e.g., Karen D. Pyke, What Is Internalized Racial Oppression and Why Don’t 
We Study It? Acknowledging Racism’s Hidden Injuries, 53 SOC. PERSP. 551,  
557 (2010). 
72 Sabrina Tavernise, Why the Announcement of a Looming White Minority Makes 
Demographers Nervous, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
11/22/us/white-americans-minority-population.html?emc=edit_rr_20181123&nl= 
race-related&nlid=4814983420181123&te=1; see Lauretta Charlton, What Is the 
Great Replacement?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/ 
08/06/us/politics/grand-replacement-explainer.html?login=email&auth=login-email 
(stating that the rallying cry of the Charlottesville white nationalists was “[y]ou will 
not replace us”).  
73 See, e.g., About Race, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census. 
gov/topics/population/race/about.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
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Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander.74  The Bureau also 
permits reporting of more than one race in the census.75  The 
Bureau website explains that “[p]eople who identify their origin as 
Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish may be of any race,” evincing the 
imprecision of measuring race even for census purposes.76 
Furthermore, according to the census definition, “White” 
includes “[a] person having origins in any of the original peoples 
of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa.”77  Under this 
imprecise rubric, the United States government homogenizes 
culturally distinct experiences.78  The experience of a Middle 
Eastern or North African (“MENA”) individual in the United 
States likely differs significantly from that of someone from 
Western Europe.79  This disparate treatment has worsened with 
the presidential election of Donald Trump in 2016.80  Additionally, 
someone of North African origin may “pass” as black, but  
under the current census categories, that individual would be 
categorized with white individuals of European origin.  
Additionally, Asian and Middle Eastern are two distinct 
categories, discounting the fact that the Middle East is a part of 
Asia.81  Ostensibly, someone of Middle Eastern descent could be 
properly categorized as either Asian or White/MENA.  While this 
provides only one illustration, the confusion inherent in the  
census categories underscores the difficulty of reliably defining 
racial groups. 
The treatment of mixed-race individuals under the Equal 
Protection Clause raises a new set of questions.  In Plessy v. 
Ferguson, the Court treated an individual who was “of mixed 
descent, in the proportion of seven-eighths Caucasian and 
 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 U.S. Muslims Concerned About Their Place in Society, but Continue to Believe 
in the American Dream, PEW RES. CTR. (July 26, 2017), http://www.pewforum. 
org/2017/07/26/findings-from-pew-research-centers-2017-survey-of-us-muslims/. 
About forty percent of Muslim adults identify as white, including Arabs and people of 
Middle Eastern descent. Id. 
79 See, e.g., Ibrahim Hooper, CAIR Report: Anti-Muslim Bias Incidents, 
Hate-Crimes Spike in Second Quarter of 2018, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN-ISLAMIC 
RELATIONS (July 12, 2018), https://www.cair.com/cair_report_anti_muslim_bias_ 
incidents_hate_crimes_spike_in_second_quarter_of_2018. 
80 Id. 
81 The Regions of Asia, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/ 
place/Asia/The-regions-of-Asia (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
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one-eighth African blood” as black.82  However, the racial identity 
of a mixed-race person may differ significantly from that of 
someone who more visibly belongs to a historically disadvantaged 
minority.83  Mixed-race Americans with one white parent may  
also identify culturally as white rather than as a member of  
the minority group.84  Additionally, according to Pew Research 
Center, more than a quarter of Asian people and Hispanic  
people marry outside of their race, which will lead to a higher  
percentage of mixed-race individuals in the United States in the 
coming decades.85 
These analyses of gender and race emphasize the need to shift 
the focus of equal protection analysis from classes to individuals.  
The failure to classify gender and race as discrete, consistently 
definable classes—if they ever were—requires a court, in 
determining whether the basis for governmental classifications is 
indeed proper, to consider the individual at issue, rather than a 
purported class to which the individual may belong. 
II. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR EQUAL PROTECTION 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The issues delineated above underscore the need for a  
new framework for equal protection jurisprudence, one not 
predicated on defined classes.  The Supreme Court itself seems to  
recognize this need whenever it does not adhere to the  
three-tiered framework and instead engages in results-oriented 
decision-making.86  Consequently, instead of urging the Court to 
increase the number of suspect classifications and to articulate a 
level of scrutiny for each, this framework urges that a balancing 
test should be employed, with candor, on a case-by-case basis.87  In 
each case where the Equal Protection Clause is implicated, a court 
should weigh government interests against individual interests.88  
 
82 163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896). 
83 Tavernise, supra note 72. 
84 Id. 
85 Gretchen Livingston & Anna Brown, Intermarriage in the United States 50 
Years After Loving v. Virginia, PEW RES. CTR. (May 18, 2017), http://www.pew 
socialtrends.org/2017/05/18/1-trends-and-patterns-in-intermarriage/. 
86 See supra text accompanying note 3. 
87 Only race, national origin, alienage, gender, and nonmarital children constitute 
suspect or quasi-suspect classes. See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 
(2016); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996); Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 
456, 461 (1988); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971). 
88 Justices Thurgood Marshall and John Paul Stevens advocated balancing tests 
in equal protection jurisprudence. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970) 
1250 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93:1235 
This framework applies to any court hearing an equal protection 
claim, whether in the first instance, on appeal, or on writ of 
certiorari.  If the government’s interest is found to be weightier 
than the individual interest, the government would prevail, and 
vice versa. 
A. Government Interest 
The government interest side of the balancing test resembles 
current equal protection jurisprudence:  it would consider the 
government’s purpose and how well the challenged classification 
fits with, or accomplishes, that purpose.89 
The government must present an intelligible purpose.  Unlike 
existing rational basis review, where the burden is on the 
challenger and the reviewing court will impute purpose, the 
government must provide an intelligible and valid purpose to the 
court.90  A purpose is invalid if it is grounded in animus.  “Animus,” 
as defined by the Supreme Court, is the “bare . . . desire to 
harm.”91  Moreno frames animus in terms of harming a “politically 
unpopular group”; however, animus can be directed at an 
individual, both in the class of one context and the notion of 
harming a person based on a characteristic that reflects his 
membership in a politically unpopular group.92 
A reviewing court should not accept the government’s 
statement of purpose as valid on its face:  the court must consider 
the law’s purpose ascertain whether the legislature was driven by 
animus in creating it.  The government’s proffered purpose also 
 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing the Court should balance “the character of the 
classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class 
discriminated against of the governmental benefits they do not receive, and the 
asserted state interests in support of the classification”); see also City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 453 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“What class 
is harmed by the legislation, and has it been subjected to a tradition of disfavor by our 
laws? What is the public purpose that is being served by the law? What is the 
characteristic of the disadvantaged class that justifies the disparate treatment?” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
89 See, e.g., Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2208 (articulating the use of purpose and fit in 
the context of strict scrutiny analysis as “purpose or interest is both constitutionally 
permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is necessary . . . to 
the accomplishment of its purpose” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
90 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) 
(“Moreover, it may be deemed important to effective regulation that the eye doctor be 
restricted to geographical locations that reduce the temptations of commercialism.”). 
91 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
92 See id.; see also Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 
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should not be a post hoc rationalization of purpose.93  To the extent 
possible, the proffered purpose must be the actual purpose.  If the 
government’s purpose is invalid, the government would 
automatically lose. 
If the government’s purpose is valid and intelligible, a court 
would next analyze fit—how well the challenged law effectuates 
the proffered interest.  A court would choose among the existing 
categories to evaluate fit.  The categories are as follows: 
(1) necessary to achieve the interest, (2) substantially related to 
the interest, (3) rationally related to the interest, and (4) of no 
relation to the interest.94  Fit informs whether the classification 
drawn by the law is overinclusive, underinclusive, or both  
over- and underinclusive.  The legislature need not draw its 
classifications with “mathematical nicety.”95  However, the  
more narrowly tailored the classification, the more likely the 
legislature is to be effectuating its actual purpose without relying  
on stereotypes or over-generalizations.96  The more tailored  
the fit is to the purpose, the more weight is given to the 
government’s interest. 
B. Individual Interest 
The individual interest side of the balancing test employs a 
multi-factor test.  This multi-factor test evaluates the individual 
characteristic upon which the government’s classification is based.  
For example, if a law restricted open service by transgender 
individuals in the military, gender identity would be the 
appropriate reference characteristic.  Using this framework, a 
court would both draw on the factors courts have historically 
evaluated in determining whether a suspect classification exists 
and apply additional factors.97  Crucially, a court need not identify 
 
93 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (“The justification must 
be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.”). 
94 See, e.g., Fisher, 136 S. Ct. at 2208; Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
95 Lindsley v. Nat’l Carbonic Gas, Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1920). 
96 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. The Court considered the breadth of the disability 
imposed by the classification as probative of whether it was valid. Id. 
97 In determining the existence of a suspect classification, courts have 
extrapolated from footnote 4 of United States vs. Carolene Products. 304 U.S. 144, 152 
n.4 (1938) (“[W]hether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a 
special condition, which tends to seriously curtail the operation of those political 
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a  
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a suspect classification implicating every individual with that 
characteristic.  This would provide a more flexible standard for 
courts to apply.  The list of factors is not necessarily exhaustive; 
however, a court would primarily rely on the factors articulated 
here and logical outgrowths of those factors that may be 
particularly applicable in a given case. 
The proposed factors are as follows, framed with reference to 
the individual characteristic upon which the classification is 
based:  (1) Has the government historically discriminated against 
people with this characteristic, or is this kind of government action 
a “new”—within the last few decades—discrimination against 
people with this characteristic?  (2) Does this characteristic have 
no impact on the individual’s ability to contribute to society?  (3) Is 
the characteristic immutable?  (4) Does the characteristic cause 
the individual to be distant from the political process?  (5) Is the 
characteristic visible?  (6) Is the government imposing a burden on 
the individual in classifying on the basis of this characteristic?  
(7) Does the characteristic lack comprehensive statutory 
protections?  (8) Does the infringed right have a close nexus to 
protected constitutional rights?  (9) Does the right being infringed 
upon cause a highly burdensome deprivation to the individual? 
The factors are listed in roughly decreasing order of 
importance; consequently, a court should accord more weight to 
the factors higher on the list.  The more factors present, the more 
weight given to the individual interest.  However, there is no level 
of mathematical precision as to the factors’ relative weight.  In 
past decisions, no single factor has been dispositive in recognizing 
a suspect class, but the presence of any one factor indicates the 
classification is “more likely than others to reflect deep-seated 
prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some 
legitimate objective.” 98  However, courts have particularly 
emphasized history of discrimination and the characteristic’s 
relation to the individual’s ability to function in society.99 
 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). Consequently, courts consider 
history of discrimination, immutability, and distance from the political process. See, 
e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–87 (1973). 
98 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982). 
99 See, e.g., Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 985–86 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (expanding on the principles of suspect class recognition from Plyler 
v. Doe); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432–35 (Conn. 2008). 
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III. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE FRAMEWORK 
A. Justifications for the Individual Interest Factors 
This section explains the inclusion of each of the factors 
relating to individual interests described above.  History of 
discrimination gets to the heart of the equal protection inquiry: 
that the government classified based on this characteristic for 
invalid reasons and in light of past maltreatment suggesting 
unfounded antipathy.100  Conversely, in terms of “new” 
discrimination, governmental discrimination need not be 
centuries-long to be disabling on a class; an example is 
discrimination, including by the Trump administration, against 
transgender individuals.101  
If the characteristic has no bearing on the individual’s ability 
to contribute in society, the government is likely invalid in 
employing it because “legal burdens should bear some relationship 
to individual responsibility.”102  In terms of immutability, are 
sexual orientation and gender identity immutable?  While an 
individual can transition to another gender, which would seem to 
imply mutability, identification as the gender to which the 
individual transitioned is immutable.  A court would need to 
grapple with these questions and take into account scientific 
evidence to determine whether this factor is present.  Distance 
from the political process undergirded the Court’s decision in 
Romer v. Evans, where LGB individuals needed to amend the state 
constitution rather than merely pass a law to disable 
discrimination against them.103  Moreover, courts need to step in 
and be more scrutinizing when the political process is not a viable  
 
 
 
 
100 See, e.g., Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684 (“There can be no doubt that our Nation 
has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”). 
101 See, e.g., Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *10–13 
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2018). 
102 Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co, 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); see, e.g., Mathews v. 
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (recognizing the imposition of penalties on an 
“illegitimate child” is illogical and unjust because the penalties have no relation to the 
child’s individual responsibility or wrongdoing). 
103 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (“Homosexuals are forbidden the 
safeguards that others enjoy or may seek without restraint. They can obtain specific 
protection against discrimination only by enlisting the citizenry of Colorado to amend 
the State Constitution . . . .”). 
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vehicle to effect change.  If the characteristic is visible, it is more 
likely that manifesting this disfavored characteristic will 
detrimentally impact the individual.104 
Considering whether a burden is imposed elevates the 
individual interest if the classification is not beneficent.105  
Current affirmative action jurisprudence treats beneficent 
classifications the same as invidious classifications; specifically in 
the context of race, this reflects the view that any use of race is 
problematic.106  However, if equal protection jurisprudence seeks 
to “ ‘smoke out’ illegitimate uses of race,” this factor gives some 
deference to the government in using race in a beneficent way, 
particularly if the means are narrowly tailored as evaluated on the 
governmental interest side of the analysis.107  The Court, in its 
current jurisprudence, considers statutory overlay as probative of 
political process access; statutes also provide extraconstitutional 
protections against governmental or private discrimination on the 
basis of the characteristic that would allow a court to defer to  
the legislature.108 
Whether the right being infringed upon has a close nexus  
to protected rights in the Constitution relates to the fundamental 
interest portion of equal protection analysis.  Under this 
framework, the Court would not have to recognize a fundamental 
interest that applies to every case moving forward but would 
evaluate the right on a case-by-case basis.  If the right is 
enumerated in the Constitution or has a close nexus to protected 
 
104 Compare Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (“Nevertheless, it can hardly be doubted 
that, in part because of the high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still face 
pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination . . . .”), with Mathews, 427 
U.S. at 505–06 (“Moreover, while the law has long placed the illegitimate child in an 
inferior position relative to the legitimate . . . perhaps in part because illegitimacy 
does not carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do, this discrimination against 
illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the historic legal 
and political discrimination against women and Negroes.”). 
105 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879) (limiting jury 
service to white males over twenty-one). 
106 See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 748 (2007) (“The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 
U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“But there can be no doubt that racial 
paternalism and its unintended consequences can be as poisonous and pernicious as 
any other form of discrimination.”). 
107 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 226 (1995) (quoting City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989)). 
108 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 443 (1985); 
Massachusetts v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 325 (1976). 
2019] SHEDDING TIERS 1255 
rights, it is more likely to warrant heightened protection.109  
Finally, if the extent of the individual’s deprivation is severe,  
the court should take this into account and elevate the  
individual interest.110 
B. Justifications for the Framework as a Whole 
This section seeks to justify the framework on a macro level.  
First, balancing tests exist in other areas of constitutional  
law, particularly procedural due process.  The applicable test for 
procedural due process from Mathews v. Eldridge balances the 
individual interest and the added value of the process sought 
against the government’s interest.111  While it is true that 
procedural due process claims differ from equal protection claims, 
the Mathews test shows courts are willing and able to engage  
in balancing in the constitutional context.112  If anything, this 
proposed framework provides more guidance to courts than the 
Mathews test by listing factors courts should consider.  More 
generally, individual interest versus government interest is 
always the fundamental inquiry in the individual rights arena of 
constitutional law.  When considering the right of free exercise, to 
bear arms, or to exercise one’s parental rights, courts inquire into  
 
 
 
 
 
 
109 See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 210 (2008) 
(recognizing voting as a fundamental right undergirding all other Constitutional 
protections); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (tying the right to 
contraception for unmarried persons to the right of privacy). 
110 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 222 (1982) (where depriving undocumented 
children of the right to education, while not a fundamental right, would impose an 
“inestimable toll” on the children throughout their lives). 
111 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (“First, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.”). 
112 Procedural due process claims typically entail considering the nature of the 
property or liberty interest involved and the degree of deprivation, the cost to the 
government in employing additional procedures, and the reliability of existing and 
proposed procedures. See id. Mathews and Goldberg v. Kelly juxtapose the need for a 
pre-termination hearing for the loss of Social Security benefits and welfare benefits, 
respectively. Id. at 323; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970). 
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whether the government is sufficiently justified in curtailing that 
individual right.113  For equal protection, the right at issue is to be 
treated equally to those similarly situated.114 
Additionally, to mitigate concerns about judicial activism,  
this framework does not require a court to recognize suspect 
classifications or fundamental rights.  Because recognizing a 
suspect classification or fundamental right triggers heightened 
scrutiny, the outcome is weighted against the government; 
conversely, in rational basis review, the outcome is weighted  
in favor of the government.115  The existence of a suspect 
classification or fundamental interest essentially disables 
classification on that basis in any situation, including in ways that 
may be valid.  Furthermore, one case may be insufficient to 
determine whether a classification always merits heightened 
scrutiny.  Based on the particular facts of a given case, the 
classification may not seem to warrant heightened scrutiny; 
however, this should not foreclose the possibility that heightened 
scrutiny may properly be employed in a different context. 116  On 
the other hand, the situation in a particular case may evince the 
need for heightened scrutiny, but the Court may be unwilling to 
extend that protection comprehensively.117  
These inherent factual discrepancies underscore the merits of 
case-by-case consideration, something courts have done before.  
For example, nonmarital child status is recognized as a 
quasi-suspect classification meriting intermediate scrutiny, and 
classifications among them are evaluated on a case-by-case 
basis.118  While immutable and unrelated to individual 
responsibility, status as a nonmarital child does not “carry an 
obvious badge” in the same way that race and gender do, and, 
consequently, the discrimination has never reached the same 
 
113 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 573 U.S. 682, 701 (2014) (right 
of free exercise); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759 (2010) (right to bear 
arms); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (parental rights). 
114 “The Equal Protection Clause directs that ‘all persons similarly circumstanced 
shall be treated alike.’ ” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216 (quoting F.S. Royser Guano Co. v. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)). 
115 See supra text accompanying note 1. 
116 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314–15 (1976) (finding a valid 
link between age and physical preparedness for police officers). 
117 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 449–50 
(1985) (where classifying on the basis of intellectual disability was impermissible  
in the context of zoning for a group home, but the Court refused to recognize a 
protected class). 
118 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
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level.119  Therefore, courts consider laws that provide a benefit to 
some nonmarital children but not to others on a case-by-case 
basis.120  In this way, courts look within the classification at the 
specific individuals in that class to determine if the use of the 
classification is justified.121 
Additionally, while cabined to one case, the Supreme Court 
recognized a “class of one” as giving rise to a valid Equal Protection 
Clause claim—that a plaintiff need not belong to a preordained 
class for individualized and arbitrary governmental treatment to 
be unlawful.122  The text of the Fourteenth Amendment further 
supports the notion that belonging to a class is not a precondition 
for an equal protection claim:  it details, in relevant part,  
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws,” which suggests that the 
individual is the focus rather than the group.123  Furthermore, the 
text does not mention classifications, protected classes, or  
fundamental interests.124 
On balance, this framework, in practice, identifies animus.125  
The prevention of classifications based on a bare desire to harm is 
the most basic purpose of the Equal Protection Clause.126  Animus 
holdings, while subject to criticism on other grounds, have the 
 
119 Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976). 
120 See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 261 (1978) (analyzing a statute requiring 
illegitimate children who would inherit from their fathers to provide evidence of 
acknowledgement of paternity during the father’s lifetime); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 
417 U.S. 628, 630 (1974) (analyzing a statute that allows illegitimate children who 
lived with a disabled parent or received support prior to disability to receive benefits). 
121 See supra text accompanying note 36. 
122 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 563–64 (2000) (where the village 
required a thirty-three-foot easement to connect the plaintiff to municipal water 
supply, when it only required a fifteen-foot easement for those similarly situated). 
“Class of one” claims do not apply to government employees. Enquist v. Or. Dep’t of 
Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 594 (2008). 
123 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
124 Id. 
125 See infra Part IV for application of the framework. 
126 See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“For if the 
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at 
the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group 
cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (“Though the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial 
in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil 
eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations 
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal 
justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.”). 
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merits of being narrow.127  The Court has relied on animus in other 
areas of constitutional law, most recently in Masterpiece Cakeshop 
v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission.128  The Masterpiece 
Cakeshop Court found antireligious hostility based on the 
comments of two commissioners that were disparaging towards 
religion and from the commission’s disparate treatment of 
religious and nonreligious claimants.129  Masterpiece Cakeshop 
speaks to the proposition that rights-restricting government 
action is unconstitutional if predicated on bad intentions.130  It 
remains to be seen how prevalent animus-based decisions will be 
after the departure of Justice Anthony Kennedy, who wrote the 
majority opinions in the animus-based decisions of Romer, 
Lawrence, Windsor, Obergefell, and Masterpiece Cakeshop.131 
This framework essentially advocates for equity judging.  
Equity means equality as fairness, rather than equality as 
sameness:  it is the idea that the government cannot treat one 
individual differently from another without justifiable reasons.  
What constitutes justifiable reasons may vary from one judge to 
another, which this framework recognizes as possibly leading to 
disparate outcomes by jurisdiction.  This does not mean that 
judges should be activists:  on the contrary, this framework erases 
the need for judges to be protectionist towards groups that may 
constitute large swaths of the population.  Some judges believe 
race is unique in the American context—that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protections were created in the context of “that race 
and that emergency,” and the political process sufficiently protects 
any other purported discrete and insular minorities.132  This 
framework rejects the notion that race should be treated 
differently at the outset than any other classification, as well as 
the slippery slope argument presented in Cleburne that 
recognizing intellectual disability as a suspect classification would 
also require recognition of “the aging, the disabled, the mentally 
 
127 See, e.g., William D. Araiza, Animus and Its Discontents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 155, 
171–73 (2019) (“A foundational critique of the animus idea maintains that it reflects 
accusations of ill will and subjective prejudice . . . . [T]his critique suggests that the 
animus idea reflects a type of ‘Manichean’ thinking that divides the world into saints 
(who reject views labelled as animus-driven) and sinners (who embrace such views).”). 
128 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–24 (2018). 
129 Id. at 1729, 1731. 
130 Id. at 1731. 
131 Id. at 1723; Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015); United States 
v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 748 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003); 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996). 
132 The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1872). 
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ill, and the infirm.”133  The fear of over-constitutionalizing the 
Equal Protection Clause is that any class towards whom the 
government may have had an intimation of malice is now subject 
to strict scrutiny analysis, and the government is thus dissuaded 
from legislating as to that group, even in ways that might have 
been legitimate.134  The problems raised in Cleburne stem from the 
Court’s own admission that it needed to “look to the likelihood that 
governmental action premised on a particular classification is 
valid as a general matter, not merely to the specifics of the case 
before us.”135 
The separation of powers and the proper role of the courts 
underlie much of equal protection jurisprudence.  Rational basis 
scrutiny seeks to defer to the political branches by assuming that 
classifications are proper in the vast majority of situations.136  
Based on this logic, judges should only abandon deference for laws 
that implicate discrete and insular minorities.137  The argument 
against recognition of suspect classifications is predicated  
on deference to the political process—that the political branches 
should decide these questions, not the judiciary.138  This 
framework, which removes the need to recognize suspect 
classifications, furthers these goals of judicial minimalism.  While 
it may seem like a drastic departure from current equal protection 
jurisprudence, as demonstrated in the next section, the outcomes 
under this new framework would often be the same as in 
employing the tiers of scrutiny.139   
 
133 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985). 
134 Id. at 444 (“Even assuming that many of these laws could be shown to be 
substantially related to an important governmental purpose, merely requiring  
the legislature to justify its efforts in these terms may lead it to refrain from acting  
at all.”). 
135 Id. at 446. 
136 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). 
137 See supra text accompanying note 97. 
138 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627, 2629 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“This is a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, super-legislative—
power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government.”); Romer v. 
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Since the Constitution of the 
United States says nothing about this subject, it is left to be resolved by normal 
democratic means . . . .”); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (Powell, 
J., concurring) (“It seems to me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a 
major political decision which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect 
appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative processes.”) (arguing that it was 
unnecessary for the court to recognize gender as a suspect class because the Equal 
Rights Amendment was up for ratification by the states and would resolve that  
very question). 
139 See infra Part IV. 
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IV. APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
A. Retrospective Example 
This example mirrors the facts of Massachusetts v. Murgia, 
where Massachusetts enacted a law requiring state police officers 
to retire at the age of fifty.140  The challenger, Robert Murgia, was 
a former officer of the Uniformed Branch of the Massachusetts 
State Police.141  In furtherance of its policy, the police department 
required that uniformed officers over the age of forty pass a more 
rigorous annual examination, including an electrocardiogram and 
tests for gastro-intestinal bleeding.142  Murgia was in excellent 
physical and mental health and passed his physical examination 
four months before his mandatory retirement.143  
The governmental interests are as follows.  The purpose 
proffered by the government is protection of the public by “physical 
preparedness of its uniformed police.”144  The government 
specifically cited the duties of uniformed officers—including those 
to “participate in controlling prison and civil disorders, respond to 
emergencies and natural disasters, patrol highways in marked 
cruisers, investigate crime, apprehend criminal suspects, and 
provide backup support for local law enforcement personnel”—as 
evidence of the need for physical preparedness.145  This purpose is 
intelligible, within the exercise of the state’s police powers, and 
appears to be valid.  It does not seem to be driven by animus based 
on age, given that there is a link between age and physical 
preparedness.146  
The fit is substantially related.  Forcing police officers to retire 
at a certain age is not the least restrictive way to effectuate 
readiness of the police force, given that individualized 
assessments could be done, which was the remedy that Murgia 
sought.147  However, it does serve generally to keep officers who 
might be in worse physical shape off of the force, and age is 
correlated with physical decline—“risk of physical failure, 
 
140 Massachusetts v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 308 (1976). 
141 Id. at 309. 
142 Id. at 311. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 314. 
145 Id. at 310. 
146 Id. at 310–11 (“[E]ven (appellee’s) experts concede that there is a general 
relationship between advancing age and decreasing physical ability to respond to the 
demands of the job.”). 
147 Id. at 316. 
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particularly in the cardiovascular system, increases with age, 
and . . . the number of individuals in a given age group incapable 
of performing stress functions increases with the age of the 
group.”148  This makes the fit more than rationally related and rise 
to the level of substantially related. 
The individual interests are as follows.  There is some 
discrimination against the elderly, but not a history of purposeful 
discrimination.149  There is a relationship between age and ability 
to function in society, particularly if function here is narrowly 
defined as service in the police force.150  Age is an immutable 
characteristic; one has no control over one’s age, and everyone 
experiences aging.151  Age is visible, but being elderly is not a 
disfavored visible characteristic in the same way as are race or 
gender.  Further, age itself does not cause distance from the 
political process.152  The government is imposing a burden, not 
conferring a benefit, in considering age in this way.  Additionally, 
age does have statutory protections under federal law, including 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.153  As to the 
right being infringed upon, there may be a property interest in 
continued government employment.154  For there to be a property 
interest, the court considers the nature of the interest, whether 
there is a mutual understanding by the parties, and whether  
there is an extraconstitutional source of the interest.155  The 
deprivation—mandatory loss of a job—is highly burdensome to  
the individual, and it is more difficult to find a job at a more 
advanced age.156  
 
148 Id. at 311. 
149 Id. at 313 (“While the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly 
free of discrimination, such persons . . . have not experienced a ‘history of purposeful 
unequal treatment’ . . . .”). 
150 See id. at 310–11. 
151 Id. at 313–14 (“[I]t marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our 
normal span.”). 
152 The average age of House members in the 115th Congress was 57.8 years  
and 61.8 years for Senators. JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
MEMBERSHIP OF THE 115TH CONGRESS: A PROFILE (2018), https://www.senate.gov/CR 
Spubs/b8f6293e-c235-40fd-b895-6474d0f8e809.pdf. 
153 Murgia, 427 U.S. at 325; see also 29 U.S.C § 623 (2018) (Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act). 
154 Compare Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972), with Board of Regents 
of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972). 
155 See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.  
156 Murgia, 427 U.S. at 323 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“While depriving any 
government employee of his job is a significant deprivation, it is particularly 
burdensome when the person deprived is an older citizen.”). 
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The fact that there is a statutory scheme to protect against 
age discrimination, while not typically dispositive, would counsel 
in favor of the government prevailing.  Additionally, this is a case 
in which there is a viable reason—in fact, a good reason—for the 
government to classify on the basis of age.  There is a public 
interest in having a competent police force, and limiting the age of 
police officers does serve to effectuate that outcome.  
Consequently, it seems, in this case, that the court should rule in 
favor of the government, given the relative tightness of fit and lack 
of individual interest factors. 
B. Prospective Example 
This example considers the transgender military ban from 
Karnoski v. Trump.  This is analyzed from the perspective of a 
hypothetical individual plaintiff who was injured by the ban.  
President Obama lifted the ban on transgender military service in 
2016; transgender individuals were never statutorily proscribed 
from military service, unlike gay and lesbian servicemembers who 
were precluded from service by Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.157  However, 
in July 2017, President Trump announced on Twitter that the 
United States would no longer “accept or allow” transgender 
people “to serve in any capacity in the U.S. military.”158  
Transgender people, for the purposes of the ban, includes people 
“with a history or diagnosis of gender dysphoria . . . [and those] 
who require or have undergone gender transition.”159  The Trump 
administration’s policy has been enjoined by four federal district 
courts.160  The Supreme Court subsequently granted defendants’ 
application for a stay of the preliminary injunction pending 
appeal; the Ninth Circuit heard the appeal in June 2019 and  
found the class of transgender servicemembers merited 
intermediate scrutiny based on an analogy to gender and  
 
 
157 Emma Margolin, With Transgender Military Ban Lifted, Obama Cements 
Historic LGBT Rights Legacy, NBC NEWS (June 30, 2016), https://www.nbcnews.com/ 
feature/nbc-out/transgender-military-ban-lifted-obama-cements-historic-lgbt-rights-
legacy-n600541. 
158 Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *2 (W.D. Wash. 
Apr. 13, 2018). There have been a number of iterations of the ban since the original 
2017 declaration; however, the ban referred to in this Note is the 2017 Twitter 
Announcement and subsequent memorandum. Id. 
159 Id. at *3. 
160 Karnoski, 2018 WL 1784464, at *1. 
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deference to military decision-making.161  It also emphasized the 
importance of as-applied reasoning, underscoring the merits of a 
case-by-case approach.162 
The governmental interests are as follows.  The government’s 
proffered purpose is that transgender individuals could 
“undermine readiness . . . and impose an unreasonable burden  
on the military.”163  Increased administrative cost and the 
conservation of scarce resources may be an intelligible purpose.164  
However, there is a real possibility that this is driven by animus, 
given the Trump administration’s treatment of transgender 
individuals.165  The fit is rationally related to the purpose of 
limiting costs, as banning transgender individuals effectuates the 
military’s purpose of not providing gender dysphoria-related 
treatment to transgender service members.  However, banning 
those individuals entirely without any particularized 
consideration is far from the least restrictive means to effectuate 
that end, and exclusion, as a remedy, is not narrowly tailored. 
The individual interests are as follows.  There is “new” 
discrimination against people with this characteristic, particularly 
from the Trump administration since President Trump took office 
in January 2017.166  There is no relationship between being 
transgender and an individual’s ability to contribute to society; the 
plaintiff would be a transgender individual who voluntarily seeks 
to serve the country through military service—an extraordinary 
contribution to society.167  However, gender dysphoria is still 
 
161 Karnoski v. Trump, 926 F.3d 1180, 1187, 1201 (9th Cir. 2019). 
162 Id. at 1200 (“[A]n as-applied approach ‘is the preferred course of adjudication 
since it enables courts to avoid making unnecessarily broad constitutional 
judgments.’ ” (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,  
447 (1985))). 
163 Trump Signs New Transgender Military Ban, BBC NEWS (Mar. 24, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-43525549. 
164 See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971). 
165 The Justice Department also informed “the Supreme Court that businesses 
can discriminate against workers based on their gender identity without violating 
federal law.” Chris Opfer, DOJ: Businesses Can Discriminate Against Transgender 
Workers, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 24, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-
report/justice-department-says-transgender-discrimination-is-lawful. 
166 Karnoski v. Trump, No. C17-1297-MJP, 2018 WL 1784464, at *10 (W.D. Wash. 
Apr. 13, 2018) (detailing the history of discrimination against transgender people, 
including “endemic levels of physical and sexual violence, harassment, and 
discrimination in employment, education, housing, criminal justice, and access to 
health care”). 
167 Id. (“Indeed, the Individual Plaintiffs in this case contribute not only to society 
as a whole, but to the military specifically. For years, they have risked their lives 
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included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (“DSM”), including DSM-V, the most recent iteration.168  
Transgender identity may or may not be visible, depending on the 
stage of transition or whether the individual has chosen to 
transition.  The characteristic, based on medical consensus, is 
immutable.169  Transgender identity also causes distance from the 
political process, if gauged by the size of the group and its 
representation in legislatures.170  The transgender population is 
less than one percent of the nation’s population, and there are  
no openly transgender members of Congress or the federal 
judiciary.171  The right to serve in the military is not 
constitutionally enumerated but is considered a civic duty.172  The 
deprivation of not being able to serve in armed forces, particularly 
if the individual was already serving in the military, is highly 
burdensome to the individual.173  The government is imposing a 
burden in considering this characteristic by refusing to allow the 
individual’s service in the military.  There are no statutory 
protections for transgender individuals in the military, except, 
perhaps, in the area of workplace discrimination.174  Title  
VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race, color, 
religion, sex, and national origin.175  If transgender identity is 
found to be included within the meaning of “sex,” this protection 
might apply.176 
 
 
serving in combat and non-combat roles, fighting terrorism around the world, and 
working to secure the safety and security of our forces overseas.”). 
168 What Is Gender Dysphoria?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, https://www.psychiatry. 
org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria (last updated  
Feb. 2016). 
169 Karnoski, 2018 WL 1784464, at *10 (“Experts agree that gender identity has a 
‘biological component,’ and there is a ‘medical consensus that gender identity is 
deep-seated, set early in life, and impervious to external influences.’ ”). 
170 See id. at *11. 
171 See id. 
172 See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 86 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(characterizing military service as a “fundamental civic obligation”). 
173 See supra Section IV.A for discussion of property interests under the 
Constitution. 
174 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2018). 
175 Id. 
176 See Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, 
Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 574–75, cert. granted (6th Cir. 2018) (finding gender identity-based 
discrimination actionable under Title VII). The Supreme Court has heard arguments 
in this case and will decide it this term.  
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Even if the transgender military ban did not automatically fail 
as based on animus, the individual would likely prevail.  
Administrative cost, while an intelligible purpose, is not 
particularly significant when weighed against the myriad 
individual interests implicated, and a total ban is far from a 
narrowly tailored way to achieve that objective.  Consequently, in 
weighing the governmental interests against the individual 
interests, the individual would succeed in an equal protection 
challenge to the ban. 
CONCLUSION 
The Equal Protection Clause seeks to ensure that the 
government treats similarly situated persons similarly.  However, 
current equal protection jurisprudence falls short due to the 
breakdown of the classes on which government classifications are 
predicated.  Gender and race are not understood the same way 
today as when they were recognized as suspect classifications; 
using those classes today is limiting and fails to consider changes 
in scientific attitudes and public perception. 
Consequently, courts should no longer engage in suspect 
classification analysis to determine whether a suspect class merits 
heightened scrutiny and should instead reorient focus towards the 
individual who manifests the characteristic upon which the 
classification is based.  This requires eliminating the tiers of 
scrutiny, as no suspect classification would trigger a heightened 
form of scrutiny in every case.  As Justice John Paul Stevens said, 
“There is only one Equal Protection Clause.  It requires every State 
to govern impartially.  It does not direct the courts to apply  
one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in 
other cases.”177 
In this vein, the framework suggested by this Note balances 
the government’s interest against the individual interest on a 
case-by-case basis.  While it may seem like a drastic departure 
from current equal protection jurisprudence, as demonstrated in 
the application section, the outcomes under this new framework 
would often be the same as under the tiered framework.  However, 
this new framework no longer relies on outdated classifications 
and recognizes the Court’s unwillingness to recognize new suspect 
classifications, as doing so often results in the Court being accused 
of policymaking.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court has engaged in 
 
177 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211–12 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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equity judging and de facto balancing in the past.  This framework 
engages in that same balancing—but with openness and frankness 
to preserve the integrity of the Court’s reputation—and does not 
serve as a complete upending of precedent. 
